Over the past two decades there has been a significant upsurge of interest and concern by scholars, policy makers, and development practitioners over the concept of adaptation (see Bassett and Fogelman 2013) . There has also been an increase in questions, particularly by scholars working on climate change, surrounding the moral and ethical dimensions related to adaptation, engaging directly with existing arguments that for adaptation to be effective it must fundamentally consider issues of equity and justice (e.g. Thomas and Twyman 2005 ). An increasing number of environmental ethicists acknowledge that climate change and climate change adaptation create moral and ethical dilemmas for which no existing ethical paradigm works (see Gardiner 2004 Gardiner , 2011 Jamieson 2014) . Rather than draw on existing understandings of what it means to be ethical, they suggest that we must imagine a new ethics that addresses the multitude of issues wrought by climate change. These types of ethical concerns over how best to adapt, however, take for granted the fact that adaptation is in itself a normative goal. Recent work in political ecology and critical disaster and hazard studies has called this idea into question, building on longstanding critiques of adaptation from these fields (e.g. Taylor 2015; Watts 2015) . In this review essay, I bring three recent publications concerned with these ethical dimensions from philosophical, critical, and critical/pragmatic perspectives into conversation with each other to answer the question of whether climate change adaptation can or should be a normative social goal. In other words, is adaptation to climate change something that ought to be strived for in public policy, development, or academic circles? In a time of increasing doubt about the ability of different populations to adapt to the impacts of climate change under a neoliberal capitalist political economy, this is an important question to ask.
The Philosophy of Adaptation and Environmental Ethics
To better understand how adaptation might address moral and ethical questions, environmental ethicists have sought to understand the epistemological grounds on which the adaptation framework rests. The authors in a recent volume, edited by Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer and titled Ethical Adaptation to Climate Change: Human Virtues of the Future, take up the argument that not only should adaptation be the norm, but that it ought to be done in ways that are ethical to human and natural worlds. This text, written in a way that often feels more like a monograph than an edited volume, 1 takes adaptation to be a type of mitigation for future catastrophic events.
1 I treat this book as a monograph due to its strong coherence across chapters. However, it is worth noting that there are minor differences in the author's arguments that should be considered. As such, I avoid making generalizations that might be refuted by a specific author instead focusing on the overall tone and argument of the book.
Adaptation is then a way not only to adjust individual practices in everyday life to the reality of a volatile environment, but a way of changing human-environment relations to reduce future impacts. Moreover, in their introductory chapter, Thompson and BendikKeymer consider adaptation to be the actions that would allow "economically developing countries to retain an upward trajectory despite climate change's effects" (Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012: 5) . To do this, ethical considerations incorporated into policy must include more than how to best adapt now, but also how to maintain environmental fidelity (i.e., an environment true to its past self ) into the future. The various authors take up a position that attempts to understand how things like ecological restoration might be considered an adaptive practice, the impact of ethical approaches to ecology and geoengineering, and what is necessary to overcome these challenges and develop a new planetary ethics.
A key point of concern for environmental ethics is that of ecological restoration. The authors argue here that, in developing a virtuous human-ecological relationship, humans must undo the damage we have wrought to the environment to the best of their ability. In the process, the authors argue that we must at least consider the historical fidelity of the land to be restored (even if climate change means we can never truly restore it to how it once was). Once "restored," human-environment relations must take a new form that does not continue the violent exploitation of resources that caused the present problems. This is because, while positive, restoration is ultimately a type of reparation or restitution that require existing negative practices to exist. Restoration, then, is a one-time goal that must coincide with new ways of interacting with the environment. In these new interactions, we use the past not as a reference point for restoration goals but as a way of finding what it is we desire about past environments.
Effectively understanding our desire for past natures also requires that we simultaneously reimagine our current and future relationships between the human and non-human world. This includes allowing the non-human world to flourish, to have autonomy, and for human-environment (and human-nonhuman) relationships to be non-hierarchal. To the highest degree possible, all forms of life should be allowed to act to their highest capabilities without limiting the ability of others to do the same. This capabilitiesbased approach requires a new kind of ethics suitable for a new way of living based on non-domination. It also requires a new set of political (and economic) institutions that recognize these ethics (for another argument for a capabilities-based approach to adaptation, see Kronlid 2014 .)
The authors here make important inroads in imagining new human-environment relationships, as well as articulating the ethical concerns required for doing so. Together they argue for a new set of environmental virtues that more accurately reflect the post-climate change world. This is in line with other scholarship on the ethical concerns of climate change (e.g. Gardiner 2004; Adger et al. 2006; Gardiner et al. 2010; Harris 2010; Broome 2012 ). However, with this text and others, there remain a number of concerns. First, many of the arguments here rest on a set of dualisms between humans and other actors in the world. Humans are separate from their environments, only able to act on them rather than be of them, for example. The same is true for the relationship between humans and non-human animals, although non-human animals remain a part of the "nature" that exists out there. What results are arguments, for example, for nature conservation that limits the potential and capabilities of peoples by promoting a singular, and largely Western, epistemology of nature (consider Neumann 1998; Brockington 2002) .
The Political Ecology of Adaptation (again)
Recent scholarship in political ecology moves beyond epistemological concerns and calls into question the ontological grounding of climate change adaptation (Cupples 2011; Grove 2014a; Grove 2014b; Taylor 2015; Watts 2015) . Rather than an obvious social solution to a natural problem, climate change adaptation as a paradigm is seen as problematically resting on and upholding a dualism between human and natural worlds. In doing so, it becomes a negative biopolitical project that seeks to regulate and constrain emergent forms of life by defining the ways in which people can adjust their lives in response to actual or potential environmental traumas. Through this regulation, adaptation treats disasters (as both biophysical and social phenomena) as natural and inevitable rather than produced and uncertain. In this way, humans are unable to affect environmental change in a meaningful way and the social, political, and economic systems that produce vulnerable populations in the first place don't necessarily need to be changed fundamentally but instead adapt and be adapted to. These scholars argue that, rather than a framework based on adaptation, one that understands the co-production of social and natural worlds is required. Thus, while not foreclosing entirely on the idea of adaptation, it treats adaptation as an only a part of a puzzle that must be embedded in a broader understanding of socio-natural worlds. This is, to a certain degree, an extension of the longer critique of adaptation that goes back several decades with the formation of the discipline of political ecology (see Watts 2015) . This is the basic argument Marcus Taylor (2015) makes in The Political Ecology of Climate Change Adaptation. Taylor begins the book with a damning critique of adaptation as a paradigm for living in an era of global climate change. He argues that climate change represents a discursive biopolitical project that seeks to render lives and livelihoods governable in ways that don't threaten the liberal democratic and capitalist institutions that have largely been responsible for producing vulnerability in the first place. Much of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere that have caused global warming can be attributed to the rise and continuation of the capitalist mode of production, and the unequal impacts faced by the third world are largely a result of histories of colonialism and postcolonial underdevelopment. To say that people should adapt, to Taylor, is to say that these populations should adjust themselves to the new global socioecological system without addressing the things that make them vulnerable in the first place, limiting the possibilities for more progressive change. Adaptation and resilience, as a paradigm for survival, manages the inequalities at the heart of vulnerability, leaving the conditions that caused vulnerability (both socioeconomically and naturally, if you were to attempt to divide the two) in place. Because adaptation treats future catastrophe as a certainty and frames itself in depoliticized and ahistorical way, Taylor argues that it cannot be considered a normative goal. We ought not to tell people to live more adaptable lives, to be more resilient individuals, in the same milieu that caused their problems in the first place.
Taylor is not alone in leveling this critique nor is he the first. Angela Oels (2005) has noted the discursive character of climate change and that there is a specific type of climate governmentality resulting from a climate biopolitics. More directly, Julie Cupples (2011) argued that adaptation is limiting as a framework because it cannot account for the ways processes of climate change and globalization occur simultaneously. Instead Cupples seeks to use a biopolitical approach informed by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari along with the autonomism of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to offer a new way of understanding adaptation as part of a process of becoming in which both humans and nonhumans live in practices of capitalist exploitation (Cupples 2011) . Such an approach, grounded as it is in an analysis of capitalism, is able to point to the multitudinous ways that people are at risk. Kevin Grove (2014a Grove ( , 2014b ) makes a similar argument when he says that the adaptation frameworks in both climate change and disaster management represent discursive biopolitical projects that open human life and socio-ecological relations to government regulation. In particular, Grove argues that resilience planning in disaster management rests on what he calls "adaptation machines" (Grove 2014a ). These constitute Deleuzoguattarian machinic assemblages that identify vulnerable populations and prescribe, and thus limit, the possibilities for adaptation (Grove 2014a) . By taking a biopolitical approach, disaster management is no longer singular and cohesive, apolitical and technical, but a way of governing life that is unstable, multiple, and tied to particular political-economic systems (Grove 2014a) . In terms of climate change adaptation, Grove's argument opens up new grounds for critique, implicating not only governments and disaster management agencies in biopolitical processes but also international actors (particularly development agencies) and even the IPCC and prescriptive scientists in taking part in an unstable biopolitical project in a way that is complementary to the Taylor's work.
Taylor never takes up the Deleuzoguattarian arguments used by Cupples and Grove, despite their strongly supporting and supplementing his own. To those familiar with the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Taylor's lack of engagement may be uncomfortable in a text that is otherwise theoretically rich. In fact, from a Deleuzoguattarian position it might be considered that biopolitical paradigms such as adaptation aren't inherently bad but can take on positive, affirmative forms or "the possibility of a coexistence of revolutionary, reformist, and reactionary elements at the heart of the same theoretical and practical doctrine" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 117; see also Grove 2014b). Despite the apparent Deleuzoguattarian underpinning throughout Taylor's book, such a consideration is never really given. While not an omission that detracts from the work as a whole, it is certainly one that raises questions about how the normative imperative of adaptation and resilience might be considered. Taylor's book represents an important engagement with the rebirth of the adaptation paradigm, continuing the tradition of political ecology's critical stand toward the topic while providing new teeth for the argument against it.
Adaptation and Resilience
While Taylor did not take up the argument that there are multiple political possibilities existing within a single paradigm, long-time critical disaster studies scholars Geoff O'Brien and Phil O'Keefe, to some extent, do. In their book, Managing Adaptation to Climate Risk: Beyond Fragmented Responses, O'Brien and O'Keefe argue that ideas like resilience are presented in at least three forms, two of which seek to maintain the status quo -as Taylor (2015), Watts (2015) , and others suggest -while the third seeks evolutionary, and perhaps even revolutionary changes in the way society is organized. This is in direct conflict with existing understandings of adaptation that see resilience not only in a relatively singular sense, but also as something of a politically conservative approach (e.g. Bassett and Fogelman 2013; Pelling 2011; Watts 2015) . Rather than reject the idea of resilience, O'Brien and O'Keefe seek to operationalize adaptation and resilience paradigms in a way that attempts to resolve the apparent contradictions that lie within the adaptation framework; similar to what Pelling (2011) calls "transformative adaptation" (see also Bassett and Fogelman 2013) . Reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and building resilience, taken to their logical conclusions, require addressing the social, political, and economic inequalities that create vulnerability in the first place without allowing "resilience to become a language of oppression in which communities are essentially told by existing powers that they are on their own" (O' Keefe and O'Brien 2014: 30) . In addressing these issues, moral and ethical concerns about climate change impacts and adaptation to them can be at least partially resolved through a focus on the structural -rather than proximate -causes of vulnerability.
That O'Brien and O'Keefe take a political economy approach to resilience is not surprising. Phil O'Keefe and his colleagues were foundational in this regard (Bassett and Fogelman 2013; see O'Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner 1976) . However, while others lament the move from a language of mitigation to one of adaptation, they see this shift as logical. This is largely because, as they point out in the book, it is unlikely that there will be any global scale reduction in GHG emissions until at least 2020. The impacts of climate change-induced sea level rise are already being felt in Small Island Developing States and other low-lying areas and they will only get worse as GHG levels increase. It is clear through the book that they share with others a serious concern for those already being affected by climate change (see, e.g. Dasgupta et. al 2009; Sethness-Castro 2012; Vinthagen 2013 ). Thus they suggest that while mitigation ought to remain on the table as a goal, there must also be efforts to address vulnerability in a way that, for all intents and purposes, is adaptation. However, because they call for adaptation to address the structural causes of vulnerability, and because these are often also tied to polluting industries, for O'Brien and O'Keefe, adaptation can be a mitigation strategy.
To this end, O'Brien and O'Keefe suggest moving toward an "adaptation continuum" framework where both processes of adaptation to climate change and economic development move to reduce vulnerability, strengthen economies, and bring about new forms of governance that are able to deal with the uncertainty and instability that comes with climate change (see also O'Brien, Devisscher, and O'Keefe 2010) . Here, the use the idea of resilience as a process of change rather than a goal to reach. As a process resilience is fluid, changing and responsive, "more focused on adaptability than stability" (O'Brien and O'Keefe 2014: 128) . To operationalize resilience in a way that ensures movement away from the status quo, O'Brien and O'Keefe suggest that top-down approaches that assume outside intervention is necessary need to be abandoned in favor of bottom-up approaches that democratize not only knowledge but also power in decision making. As they put it, "trying to impose a resilience concept on existing structures implies a view that 'you are responsible for yourselves'. We have no problem with that, providing that resources and power go along with the responsibility" (O'Brien and O'Keefe 2014: 147) .
O'Brien and O'Keefe are not alone in thinking that resilience can be potentially transformative. In a recent "progress report" on political ecology, Matt Turner (2014) has suggested that political ecologists, who are, at the very least, wary of the idea of adaptation and resilience, might find common ground with what he calls "resilience ecologists" in terms of understanding land use change. David Chandler (2014) argues that resilience, rather than focusing on "bouncing back" -a major point of contention for scholars like Taylor (2015) -is now better understood as the selfgovernance of complexity. In this way, resilience rejects both top-down and bottom-up approaches to instead focus on how individuals deal with the emergence of new hazards in everyday life. Likewise, drawing on complexity theory, Chandler suggests that in adapting in resilient ways, individual actors are creating new conditions to which they must also adapt. The result is that resilience itself becomes an emergent governance structure whose specific meaning cannot exist prior to the conditions in which it emerges (Chandler 2014) .
If there is a shortcoming in Managing Adaptation to Climate Risk it is the question that plagues most critical studies of climate change: how do we get to a radical form of resilience, open to multiple and emergent ways of adapting, from the current conservative form of adaptation outlined by Bassett and Fogelman (2013) ? The authors struggle with this admirably, proposing different ways to do development that addresses climate change in new ways, but are never able to resolve convincingly many of the contradictory issues that come up from this. This is because, as Chandler (2014) points out, resiliencethinking rejects both the top-down and bottom-up forms of risk management that underlie O'Brien and O'Keefe's suggestions. Instead, resilience-thinking rests in the collective action of individuals making it bottom-up to some extent, but not in a way that can be planned. Participatory development, for example, that builds resiliency would require addressing some of the issues of inclusivity raised after two decades of research on the subject. However, any planning that seeks to address these issues limits the actions of individuals and may create new problems in the future (for critiques of participatory development see, e.g., Cornwall 2003; Mohan and Stokke 2000) . While O'Brien and O'Keefe make a laudable attempt to address these concerns, specifics of how development itself must be reimagined are left somewhat vague.
Conclusion
Throughout these texts, and regardless of the specific position taken by the authors, a general understanding of a truly normative position begins to emerge. A paradigm that addresses the proximate causes of vulnerability while leaving in place the structural causes is unacceptable. The issue for the critics (e.g. O' Keefe and O'Brien 2014; Taylor 2015) is that the language of adaptation acts as a biopolitical project seeking to govern life at the level of the individual. Using the terms "adaptation" or "resilience" in policy circles invokes a discursive practice that seeks to manage, and thus limit, the possibilities for the future. In their analysis, mainstream discourses of adaptation are conservative products concerned more with maintaining the status quo than lives. In this regard, Bassett and Fogelman (2013) argue that as much as 70 per cent of adaptation scholarship is focused on proximate vulnerabilities related to climate change rather than structural factors. What's needed for climate change research, as suggested by Taylor (2015) , is not just a framework within which we piece together the multiple proximate and structural factors that cause vulnerability and from which we distill the appropriate response -no matter how emancipatorybut instead a careful, historically grounded analysis of what makes people vulnerable, an analysis in the spirit of the early works of political ecology. Additionally, however, per O'Brien and O'Keefe (2014), scholars should not be afraid of the terms they critique but should recognize their potential to address the structural issues affiliated with their use in policy circles. What this all points to is a normative ethics grounded, at least to some degree, in the poststructuralist ethics outlined by Todd May (1994) . Here, scholars should, as far as possible, avoid "representing others to themselves -in either who they are or what they want -" while allowing other ways of knowing and doing to flourish (May 1994: 130) .
